Since President Hassan Rouhani took office in July 2013, there has constantly been controversy over what worries the opponents of the long-awaited nuclear deal between Iran and the 5+1 group of world powers, particularly those who are worried about Iran’s potential return to the international community.

Hard-line Republicans in the United States and those in Congress, as well as Persian Gulf Arab states and Israel are all harshly critical of U.S. President Barack Obama and his Foreign Secretary John Kerry.

Is all this anger and worry merely over a nuclear deal between Iran and its negotiating partners? I personally do not think so as this excuse is not that compatible with a sound diplomatic rationale.

As long as Tehran-Washington ties and the peculiarities surrounding it are concerned, many analysts believe that the main reason behind the sabotage efforts and objections against Iran’s nuclear deal is Iran’s future foreign policy approach rather than the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue.

Opponents hold that Iran would enjoy a different regional and international status after a nuclear pact is clinched, which would naturally lead to the opponents’ fading role in the eyes of the United States.

“Washington would soon ask us to vacate the sun-facing room of the Middle East for the residence of Iranians,” a UAE residing Arab diplomat quoted a senior UAE Foreign Ministry official as telling a French diplomat.

“This privilege would not be given to them [Iranians] only for the sake of a nuclear deal,” the UAE Foreign Ministry official said, the Arab diplomat said on condition of anonymity.

However, Israeli leaders also have their own concerns. They are very well aware that under the pressure of resolving the Iranian nuclear case, the world public opinion would sooner or later start asking ‘why just Iran?’ while Israel is the sole possessor of nuclear weapons arsenal in the Middle East and conducts unconventional nuclear activities in the region. Therefore, Tel-Aviv seeks to keep the illusive fear of the Iranian nuclear activities alive to divert the world public opinion away of its own nuclear conducts.

In a more general prospective, nonetheless, it seems that this future foreign policy approach of Iran is the main reason for creating worries for its opponents. Simply delving into the comments made by the Emirati official, it could be inferred that if world powers can sort out with Tehran the most outstanding and complicated challenge of the last fifty years, i.e. the Iranian nuclear issue, why shouldn’t they be able to resolve their other issues, ranging from security challenges and diplomatic standoffs to guarantee their optimum interests?

The differences, such as the security order in the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East, campaign against terrorism, extremism, and production and provision of energy security, as well as development and ensuring investment, albeit more dividing, are not more complicated and difficult than the nuclear standoff. The resolution of such differences could potentially lead to the policy of ‘cooperation strategy and common interests’.

Nevertheless, will the long-awaited nuclear pact, to be reached by its June 30 deadline or with at most a week of extension to July 7, break the barriers to extensive cooperation between Iran and the international community?

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif holds that everything now depends on the 5+1 group’s “political will”. The position taken by Zarif could be regarded as a highly sophisticated and diplomatic description of the concept, and displays that a technical framework has already been reached and that Tehran has taken tough decisions.

All the evidences suggest that the ground is ready for bypassing the barriers of distrust, and as stated by Zarif, the 5+1 group should also prepare itself for taking tough decisions. As put by Henry Kissinger, final decisions might not be favorable, but they are certainly necessary.

MD/P